The Vicarious Liability of a Master for the Torts of His Servant by Macaulay, Wallace D.
10 U. N. B. LAW JOURNAL
THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF A MASTER FOR 
THE TORTS OF HIS SERVANT
It is a well-established doctrine that, under certain conditions, a 
master is liable for the injuries which his servant causes to third parties. 
The basis of this doctrine has yet to be satisfactorily explained. One of 
the earliest suggestions as to its basis was that of Holt, C. J., when he 
stated about 1700:
for seeing som ebody m ust be the loser by this deceit, it is m ore reason 
that he that em ploys and p u ts a trust and  confidence in the deceiver 
should  be a loser, than a stranger.*
During the past two and a half centuries many other eminent jurists 
and text-book writers have expressed their opinions on why liability 
chould settle upon one who has personally committed no wrong: some 
have suggested that he who sets a force into motion for his benefit and 
under his control should be responsible for its actions and results; many 
have felt that there should be a remedy against one who is in a position 
to pay for the damages suffered — and up until recent times, that person 
has usually been the master rather than the servant; still others have 
attempted to find a logical basis for the doctrinc rather than suggesting 
social or economic reasons why it should exist, but with little success.12
Recently Denning, L. J., proposed that what has always been regard­
ed as vicarious liability is actually personal liability to see that care is 
exercised by one’s servant; that a negligent act or omission by a servant 
amounts to personal default in the master himself.3 His Lordship stated:
T h e  reason for the m aster's liab ility  is not the m ere econom ic re a s­
on that the em ployer usually  has m oney and the servant has not. It is 
the sound m oral reason that the servant is do ing  the m aster ’s business, 
an d  it is the duty  o f the m aster to see that his business is properly  and 
carefu lly  done. A m aster who sends a lorry out on the road with his 
servant in charge is m orally  responsib le for seeing that the lorry does 
not run down peop le on the p a v e m e n t . . . .  It is h is lorry, and it is 
engaged on his business. H e takes the benefit of the work when it is 
carefu lly  done, an d  he m ust take the liab ility  when it is negligently  
done. H e is h im self un der a  duty  to see that care is exercised in the 
driv in g  of the lorry on his business. I f  the driver is negligent there is 
a breach o f du ty , not only by the driv er h im self, bu t a lso  by the 
m aster.*
His Lordship apparently bases his reasoning upon a literal applicat­
ion of the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se:  ne who acts tnroueh 
another, acts through himself. In fact, in a later case,5 he quotes this 
maxim and states that an employer is made liable, not so much for the 
employee’s fault, but rather for his own fault committed through the 
employee.6 The House of Lords, however, has expressly rejected his Lord­
ship’s submission. In disposing of it Lord Reid stated:
i l l  Hern v. N ichols, 1 Salk. 289; 91 E R. 256.
I2> See L a sk i; "T h e  B asis  of V icarious L iab ility " , 26 Y ale L .J .  105.
i 3 i Broom v. Morgan 119531 1 All E.R. 849.
(4i Ibid. at pp 853-854.
(51 Jones v. Ktaveley Iron & Chem ical Co., Ltd. 119551 1 A ll E.R. 6.
(61 Ibid., at p. 8.
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It is a rule o f law that an em ployer, though  qu ilty  o f no fau lt o f 
him self, is liab le  for dam age done by the fau lt or negligence o f his 
servant acting  in the course of his em ploym ent. T h e  m axim s respon d­
eat su perior an d  qu i facil per a liu m  facit per se are o ften  used, but 
I do not think that they add  an yth in g or that they lead to any d iffe r ­
ent results. T h e  form er m erely states the rule badly  in two words, and 
the latter m erely gives a fiction al ex p lan atio n  o f i t J
So while many jurists and text book writers continue to search for 
the basis of the doctrine of vicarious liability, and others have long aban­
doned any hope of finding the font from which it has sprung, it cannot 
be deniea that the rule is universally accepted and applied.
A master will be vicariously liable if his servant is acting within the 
scope or course of his employment when the act or omission, which is 
complained of, occurs. If a servant is doing something “ on a frolic of his 
own” , his master will not be liable as the servant has exceeded the bounds 
of his employment;8 under such circumstances the servant occupies the 
position or a stranger in relation to his master. The determination of 
whether an act or omission is within the scope of a servant's employment 
is always a question of fact which will turn on the particular circum­
stances of each case.
There is no doubt that a master is responsible for those acts which 
he has expressly authorized his servant to do and that are tortious in 
themselves or will necessarily result in a tort when carried out.9 Difficulty 
in determining liability arises when the servant performs an authorized 
act in a negligent or unauthorized manner, or commits an act which is 
cither unauthorized, prohibited or maybe even criminal. In such cases 
the master, in attempting to avoid vicarious liability, usually alleges that 
the servant has removed himself from the scope of his employment by 
his actions.
The master may argue that it is never within the scope of his serv­
ant’s employment to do an act in a negligent manner. In a sense, the act 
complained of has not been authorized. However, if the servant is act­
ing within the scope of his employment when he committed the act 
complained of, he is merely doing something in a careless and negligent 
manner which he was employed to do carefully.
For example, in Century Ivsurance Co., Ltd . v. Northern Ireland  
R oad  Transport B oard10 the board had in its employ a gasoline truck 
driver. While delivering gasoline into the tanks of a gasoline station 
from his truck, he lighted a cigarette and carelessly threw away the 
lighted match which resulted in a fire and considerable damage. One of 
the questions was whether the driver’s negligence was within the course 
of his employment. Lord Wright stated in the House of Lords:
(7) Staveley Iron A Chem ical Co., Ltd. v. Jones, (1956) 1 AU E.R. 403 at p. 409.
18' B attlitoni ▼ Thomas and Thomas [1932] S.C.R. 144; Hoar ▼. Wallace et al [1938] O R  
666 .
(9) See  H ais. <2nd> Vol. 22 a t pp. 221 et seq.
(10) T1942) 1 AU E.R . 491.
12 U. N. B. LAW JOURNAL
I he act o f a w orkm an in ligh ting his p ip e  or cigarette is an act done 
for his own com fort am i convenience an d  at least, generally  speaking, 
not for his em ployer's benefit. T h a t  last condition  however, is 110 lon g­
er essential to  fix  liab ility  on the em ployer. (L loyd  t >. ('.race, Sm ith  &
Co.). N or is such an act prim a facie  negligent. It is in itself both 
innocent and harm less. T h e  negligence is to be found by considering 
the tim e when and the circum stances in which the m atch is struck and 
thrown down. T h e  duty  of the workm an to his em ployer is so to co n ­
duct h im self in doing his work as not negligently to cause dam age e ith ­
er to the em ployer h im self or his property  or to third persons or their 
p roperty, and thus to im pose the sam e liability  on the em ployer as if 
he had been doin g  the work h im self an d  com m itted the negligent act.
T h is  m ay seem too obvious as a m atter of com m on sense to requ ire  
cither argum en t or au th o r ity .!'
The act of a servant that is complained of may have been performed 
in an unauthorized manner, but that in itself will not remove it from 
the scopc of his employment as was evidenced in a recent Nova Scotia 
case.12 In that case it was part of an usher’s duties to see that no dis­
turbance occurred in the theatre and that no one talked or placed their 
feet upon the seats. H. was a patron and upon his making a disturbance, 
the usner requested him to leave. An exchange of words took place and 
the usher struck H. believing that the latter was about to hit nim. The 
court found that unnecessary violence had been used and held the thea­
tre owners vicariously liable even though they had not authorized the 
use of such violence; the usher was performing his duties of keeping 
order in the theatre but he was doing it in an unauthorized manner.13
It is not unusual for an employee to be informed by his employers 
at the time he is hired that he is not to do certain things while purport­
ing to carry out his duties — or he may receive notice of such instruct­
ions from time to time while he is witnin their employ. A disregard of 
such prohibitions will not of itself remove the servant from the sphere 
of his employment if it only affects the manner or mode of performing 
his authorized duty.
For example, notice the case of C.P.R. v Lockh art14 where the rail­
way company issued instructions that its employees were not to drive 
their own cars in connection with company business unless they carried 
insurance against public liability and property damage risks. S. was em­
ployed by tne company as a carpenter and general nandyman and had 
full knowledge of tnis prohibition. In the course of his employment he 
prepared a key for a locker in the company’s North Station at Toronto. 
Upon being instructed to proceed to the North Station for the purpose 
of testing tne key, he took his own car, which was uninsured, although 
there were other means of transportation available. On the way he negli­
gently injured the infant respondent who commenced an action against 
him and the company. The trial judge dismissed the action against the
(11) Ibid., at p. 497.
(12) Hyslop *  Hyalop r. M E. W alker Ltd. [195«) 1 D.L.R (2d) 777.
(13) Cf. G r iff«  T. Soath ilde Hotel Ltd. and German [1947 ] 4 D.L.R. 49; a lso  note Percy v 
Corporation of City of G lasfow  [1922] 2 A.C. 299.
(14) (19421 3 D.L.R. 530.
U. N. B. LAW JOURNAL 13
company upon the ground that the driving of a privately owned and un­
insured car was not an act falling within the class of acts which S. was 
authorized to perform. Eventually the case was considered by the Judic­
ial Committee of the Privy Council. It was of the opinion, in view of 
the fact that S. was required to travel between stations in the course of 
his employment, that the means of transportation used was clearly in­
cidental to the execution of that which he was authorized and employed 
to do; the prohibition merely limited the means by which he was to 
cxecute the wotk he was employed to do. A breach of that prohibition 
was not sufficient to remove S. from the course of his employment. T he 
company was vicariously liable to the injured infant.
If a master could hide behind a prohibition all he would have to do 
to be immune from vicarious liability would be to instruct his servant 
never to commit a tortious act. However, as Mr. Justice Willes once 
commented on such prohibitions:
In my opin ion  those instructions are im m aterial. If  disobeyed, the 
law casts upon the m aster a liab ility  for the act of his servant in the 
course of his em ploym ent; an d  the law is not so fu tile  as to allow  a 
m aster, by g iv in g  secret in structions to his servant, to d ischarge h im ­
self from  liability.!®
It was not until after the turn of the last century that any auestion 
appears to have been raised as to whether a servant’s act should be for 
the benefit of his master to be within the scope of employment. Indeed, 
cases up to that time seem to imply that an act was, of necessity, for the 
benefit of a master to be within tne scope of his servant’s employment. 
However, in 1912 the House of Lords round itself squarely faced with 
the problem in Lloyd v. Grace, Smith &  Co.16
In that case Mrs. Lloyd owned a cottage and held a mortgage on 
other property. She desired to find a more profitable investment and 
approached the defendant firm with that thought in mind. She was 
interviewed by one S., the defendant’s managing clerk, who conducted 
all the conveyancing business of the firm, and believing him to be a 
partner of the firm, placed the matter in his hands. By divers fraudul­
ent means he had the cottage conveyed and the mortgage assigned to 
him, both of which he turned into cash and used for his own ends. The 
sole partner of the defendant firm contended that S. was not acting with­
in the scope of his employment because his actions were solely for his 
own benefit and not tnat of his employer. Their Lordships expressly 
rejected this defence, stating that it was a tortious act wilfully committed 
by S. in conducting the business which he had a right to conduct hon­
estly on behalf of his employer. The fact that the benefit derived from 
the clerk’s actions accrued to the clerk alone did not of itself take the 
fraud out of his scope of employment.
(15) L lm pat v. London General Omnibus Company (1862), 1 H. & C. 526 at p. 539; 158 
E.R. 993 at p. 998.
(16) [1912] A.C. 716.
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The Llovd  case also illustrates the point that the wilful 
commission of a crime during the course of employment will not of it­
self remove a servant from his sphere of employment or relieve his mas­
ter from the vicarious liability arising as a result of that crime.17 In a 
later case the English Court of Appeal found that the owner of a private 
detective agency was vicariouslv liable for personal injuries suffered by 
a lady when an operator from tlie agency blackmailed her in attempting 
to force her co-operation in securing certain information desired by the 
owner of the agency.18
The problem sometimes arises as to whose servant a man was at 
the time he committed a tortious act. Such a situation can occur when a 
general employer gratuitiously lends or hires out one of his employees to 
another party to perform certain tasks for that party. If such an employee 
negligently injires X. in performing those tasks, to whom, besides the 
employee, can X. look for damages? Is the situation clarified bv the gen­
eral employer contracting with the sub-hirer, at the time of the lending 
01 hiring out, that the servant shall be the servant of the latter while 
working for him? The determination of this problem is of the utmost 
importance from the injured partr's point of view: he could join both 
as partv defendants but, of course, he does not want to incur needless 
costs which he would have to pay bv bringing an action against the per­
son who is not vicariously liable.
In M ersey Docks and H arbour Board v Coggins &  Griffiths (L iver­
pool) Ltd . and M cF arlan e .19 the Board hired out to the respondent steve­
doring company a crane, together with its driver, one Newall, for the 
purpose of loading a ship lying in Liverpool harbour. In the contract of 
hire it was provided that the driver would be the servant of the steve­
doring company. While loading the ship Newall negligently ran into and 
injured one McFarlane, who sued Newall and the Board for damages. 
The Board brought an action to have the judgment against it discharged 
and to have substituted for it a judgment in favour of McFarlane for the 
same amount against the stevedoring company, claiming that Newall 
was, at the time of the accident, the servant or employee of that com­
pany.
In determining whether the Board or the Company were Newall’s 
masters at the time the accident occurred, their Lordships stated that the 
test was: who had the right to control  and direct how Newall was to 
carry out his work and operate his crane, as distinct from who had the 
right to directly benefit from his services? Applying this test, their Lord­
ships found that the Board alone had the right to control Newall and 
direct the manner in which he worked. As Lord MacMillan stated:
T h e  stevedores were entitled  to tell him w here to go, what parcels to 
lift, and where to take them , i.e., they could  d irect him  as to what they 
w anted him  to do, bu t they had no au th ority  to tell him how he was
(17) A lso note Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L .R . 2 Ex. 259.
(18) Janvier v. Sw eeney and another 119191 2 K. B. 316.
(191 f 1946 ] 2 A ll E.R. 345.
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to handle the crane in doing his work. In d riv in g  the crane, wh'ch was 
the board 's p roperty  confidcd to his charge, he was actin g  as the serv­
ant of the board , not as the servant o f the stevedores. It was not in 
consequence o f any order o f the stevedores that he negligently  ran down 
the p la in tiff. It was in consequence o f his negligence in d riv in g  the 
crane, that is to say, in p erfo rm in g the work which he was em ployed 
by the board to do.2<>
Viscount Simon pointed out, however, that the stevedoring com­
pany could have been liable if they had interfered and given directions 
to Newall as to how to drive the crane and he had complied with the 
resulting injury to McFarlane. In such a case the company would have 
been liable as joint tort feasors.-1
In presenting the case the Board’s counsel placed considerable rel­
iance upon the clause in the hiring agreement to the effect that Newall 
was to be considered the servant of the stevedoring company. Their Lord­
ships pointed out, however, that such a clause was not in itself sufficient 
to make Newall a servant of the stevedoring company. Before this could 
happen Newall would have to consent to the exchange: he could not be­
come the servant of another against his will as the relationship of master 
and servant is a contractual one. Of course, his consent could be either 
expressed or implied, but as their Lordships pointed out, there is never 
a presumption that a change of employers has taken place. The burden 
is upon tne person who claims that such a ¿Iiange has been effected, 
and it is a much heavier burden than merely showing that the benefit 
of a servant’s services has been transferred.22
Although the type of clause just mentioned is insufficient in itself 
to bring about an exchange of employers, it is sometimes useful in deter­
mining whether the contracting parties intended that the general em­
ployer should be indemnified by the particular for the tortious acts of 
the former’s servant when performing services for the latter. Of course, 
the prudent general employer will have an indemnification clause 
expressly inserted in the contract of letting or hiring so as to avoid any 
doubt as to what was intended—but again this will not affect the right 
of injured third parties to sue the general employer if he has the right 
to control at the time the injury occurs.
As we have noted, a master is vicariously liable for the negligent acts 
of his servant when they occur within the scope of the servant's em­
ployment whether they are authorized or not. However, if the servant 
is not liable for the act complained of, the master can have no vicarious 
liability, regardless of what his personal liability may be. The one except­
ion to this general rule is when the servant causes personal injuries to his 
or her wife or husband, as the case may be.
(20) Ibid, a t p. 349.
(21) Ibid. at p. 349.
(22) A lso note Q atrm tn  v. Barnett and another [1840 ] 6 M. 8c W. 499; 151 E.R . 509; Bain 
▼. Central Verm ont R ailw ay Company [1921] 2 A.C. 412; Century Insurance Company 
v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board, [1942] A .C . 509; Chowdhary and another  
v. G illot and others [1947] 2 A ll E.R . 541.
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At Common Law and under the Married W oman’s Property Act 
of the Province of New Brunswick,23 neither a husband nor a wife can 
sue the other for personal injuries. However, this immunity is personal 
to the spouse alone and does not extend to their respective employers 
if the injury occurs negligently during the course of employment.
In Broom v. M organ 2* Mr. and Mrs. B. were employed by the 
defendant to run a public house. While Mr. B. was carrying bottles of 
beer from the cellar to the bar on the floor above, he negligently left a 
trap door open behind the bar without warning Mrs. B. or taking any 
steps to protect the opening. Mrs. B. failed to notice the opening ancl 
fell through, suffering personal injuries. Mrs. B. brought an action 
against the defendant, who raised the defence that in view of the fact 
that she could not sue her husband for his negligent act, she in turn 
could not bring an action against his employer for vicarious liability. The 
Court of Appeal upheld tne trial judge’s decision that the defendant 
employer was liable to Mrs. B. for injuries sustained, notwithstanding 
the legal immunity of Mr. B. from action at the suit of his wife. As 
Denning, L. J. stated:
H is (the husband's) im m unity  is a m ere rule o f procedure and not 
a rule o f substantive law. It is an im m unity from  suit and not an 
im m unity  from  duty  or liab ility . H e is liab le to his wife, a lthough  
his liab ility  is not enforceab le by action , and, as he is liable, so also  is 
h is em ployer, but with the d ifference that the em ployer’s liab ility  is 
enforceab le by action.25
The case of Broom v. M organ  could have had its sequel if Mr. B. 
had been a person of substance. It appears, however, that the employer 
considered Mr. B. unworthy of a suit in order to regain the monies which 
had to be paid to Mrs. B. for the injuries caused ner by the negligence 
of Mr. B. Although the average employee may not realize it, one of the 
implied terms of the contract of employment with his employer is, if 
it is not expressly stated otherwise, that the employee shall perform his 
duties with proper care and skill.28 Therefore, if an employee negligently 
performs his duties and injures a third party, the master may sue thé 
employee for breach of contract to regain any damages which he (the 
master) has had to pay upon his vicarious liability to the injured party. 
Although the sanction of dismissal is usually invoked, an action for 
damages at the suit of the master has always been available, but it 
appears to have rarely, if ever, been used. However, I submit that we will 
see a change in this situation now that the pendulum of improved econ­
omic conditions is rapidly swinging in favour of the working class. In 
the future our Mrs. B. will hesitate to sue her employer for personal 
injuries caused by the negligence of her husband for fear that the em­
ployer will in turn bring an action against Mr. B. and the family circle 
will be no better off financially.
(23* R .S .N .B . 1952, c. 140. s. 56 (2).
• 24) [1953] 1 A ll E .R . 849.
125) Ibid , a t p. 855.
126) H irm cr v. Cornelius (1858 ) 5 C .B .iN .S .i 236 a t p. 246; 141 E.R . 94; L iste r  r .  Rom ford 
Ice *  Cold Storage Co. L td .. [1957] 1 A ll E. R. 125.
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In the recent English case of Lister v. Rom ford Ice &  Cold Storage  
Co. L td .,21 the pendulum had apparently swung sufficiently far enough 
to encourage an action for breach of the implied term to take care in 
the contract of employment. The appellant, L., and his father were em­
ployed by the respondent company as lorry driver and helper respective­
ly. In the course of his employment, L. negligently ran into and injured 
his father, who obtained judgment for damages against the company for 
his son’s negligence. The company’s insurers paid the judgment and 
then, being subrogated to the company’s rights and with a view to 
regain the amount they had to pay to L .’s father, brought an action in 
the name of the company against L. for breach of the implied contract­
ual duty to drive with care. The insurance company was successful in 
obtaining judgment against L. in the amount of £1600 and costs, which 
was upheld on appeal by both the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords, although Doth Courts were divided.
This case is a practical illustration of the liability of a servant for 
failure to perform his duties with proper care and skill. However, there 
were other facts and findings equally interesting and important.
The respondent company was insured in respect of any liability 
which might be incurred Dy or arising out of the use of their vehicles 
upon the road. Such insurance was compulsory by statute before the 
company could lawfully operate any vehicles upon the highway.28 There 
was also a form of endorsement upon the policy which provided that the 
indemnity given by the policy would be extended to any person in the 
employ of tne company while driving a vehicle on the company’s orders 
and for company’s purposes; in other words, while acting within the 
scope of their employment.
L. contended that the endorsement protected him against the com­
pany’s claim for indemnity. The House of Lords, however, brushed this 
contention aside by stating that the endorsement only covered third 
party claims and it was not that type of an action that faced L. in this 
case, but rather a claim for breach of a contractual duty. It is difficult to 
understand why this contention was dismissed in such a summary 
manner, as there appears to be sufficient grounds for considering the 
submission that L  s liability actually arose out of the use of a motor 
vehicle: if he had not been driving the vehicle this action would never 
have arisen. An action for breach of contract merely served as the med­
ium of attacking L; L ’s liability arose out of the negligent operation of 
one of the company’s vehicles. However, such suggestions were disposed 
of without consideration.
Two further defences, among others, raised by L ’s counsel were 
considered to some extent by their Lordships, and one, in particular, 
caused divided opinion.
(27) [1957] 1 A ll E.R . 125.
(28) Road T raffic  A ct. 1930, s. 35 (1).
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Firstly, counscl contended that an implied term in the contract of 
service was that the respondent company would indemnify L. against 
all claims and proceedings brought against him for any act aone by him 
in the course of his employment. This contention is all-embracing; what­
ever the degree of negligence and whether wilfully done or not, L  claim­
ed that he should go free and the respondent company should bear the 
burden. This contention was rightly rejected upon the ground that it 
would not be consistent with the duty of a driver to take reasonable 
care in driving his employer’s vehicle.
Secondly, counsel contended that an implied term in the contract 
of service was that L. would receive the benefit of any contract of in­
surance effected by the respondent company covering their liability in 
respect of the action brouglit by L ’s father.
Viscount Simon confused the issue by onlv considering an amend­
ment of this plea made by L ’s counscl. This amendment was to the effcct 
that L. was entitled to be indemnified not only if the resjiandent com­
pany were in fact insured or required by law to be insured, but also if 
they ought, as reasonable and prudent employers, to have been insured 
against the risk in question. His Lordship dismissed the whole matter 
by declaring that the alleged implied term was not precise enough, that 
it was impossible to show when such a term was first supposed to have 
come into existence in the Common Law, that it was impossible to know 
where to draw the line (i.e., did it just apply to truck drivers or would 
it extend to other types of employees?), and that it would conflict with 
the employee’s obligation to talce care: none of which reasons, I submit, 
is very forceful.
Both Lord Morton and Lord Tucker felt that the implied term as 
originally stated was unnecessary to give the transaction such efficacy as 
both parties must have intended that it should have at the time the em­
ployee entered into his employer’s service. Their Lordships also stated 
that such a term was unacceptable as it would deprive the insurers of 
their right of subrogation upon payment of any claims against the in­
sured. However, they appear to nave overlooked the fact that there is 
no rule of law preventing the insured from fettering away his rights to 
third parties; as Lord Somerville pointed out, the insurer only succeeds 
to those rights which the insured possessed at the time the cause of 
action arose.2*
Lord Radcliffe and Lord Somervell were of opinion that such an 
implied term (whereby the appellant was to have the benefit of the em­
ployer’s insurance) existed and would have allowed the appeal.
Lord Radcliffe based his opinion upon the fact that the employer 
was compelled by statute to carry insurance coverage against third party 
claims; without such coverage it was illegal to placc vehicles upon the 
highway. His Lordship stated that in his view it was the employer’s duty
(291 [19571 1 All E .R . 125 at p. 147.
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to procure the insurance, and it followed as a result that both he and 
his employees would impliedly agree that the coverage should be for 
the benefit of the latter as well as the employer himself.
Lord Somervell came to his conclusion independently of the sta­
tutory obligation. He stated:—
W hen a m an is engaged  as a ch affeur or a lorry driver, the question  
w hether h is resources are at risk, sh ou ld  he cause d am age  through his 
negligence, is a s im portan t to him  as it is to an ow ner driver. N oth ing  
was said  in th is case and I dare  say nothin g is usually  said . If, when 
such a contract was lieing negotiated , the question  has been raised, 
it is obvious, I think, that the ap p e llan t w ould have stip u la te d  for 
the usual cover that an ow ner driv er provides for him self. If  nothin g 
is sa id , it is. in my o p in ion , for the em ployer to see that the d riv er ’s 
resources are protected by insurance. It is inconsistent with such an 
ob ligation  that the em ployer should  seek by action  to m ake the driver 
personally  liab le , as in the presen t c a s e .3 0
As a result of the decision in the Lister case, an almost intolerable 
situation has now developed in England under circumstances where 
employers and employees are covered oy insurance policies similar to the 
one under consideration in that case. As Lord Radcliffe stated:
T h e  situation  is this. If an  accident takes p lace through  negligence, 
the person in ju red  can sue either em ployer or em ployee or both of 
them . If he sues the em ployee, alone, the latter calls on the insurance 
co m p am  for the cover which the em ployer has b rought h im ; the 
insurance co m p am  has to provide the fun d  o f d am age  requ ired : 
neither the wages nor the savings o f the em ployee can be touched to 
reim burse ihe insurers for the i isk that thev have underw ritten . But 
if the in ju red  person lakes a d ifferen t course, one which neither 
em ployer, em ployee nor in surance com pany can control, an d  sues the 
em ployer e ith er a loue or jo in tly  with the em ployee, the position  of the 
em ployee is, ap p aren tly , very m uch worse an d  the position  o f the 
insurance com pan y, ap p aren tly , m uch better. For now the latter can 
indem nify  itself for the m oney it fin ds by gettin g  it back from  the 
em ployee in the em ployer’s nam e an d  the form er, in stead  of getting 
the benefit o f the insurance which his em ployer was to provide, is 
in the end of the one who foots the b ill .s t
If the injured party and the employee were husband and wife, a 
dilemma would really exist. The only course of action available would 
be against the employer, but lie in turn, or his insurers by subrogation, 
might well bring an action against the negligent husband and tale out 
of the same sugar bowl on the top shelf via the husband what has 
already been placed there via the wife.
If the employee is to be protected from suits at the instance of his 
employer, he will either have to cam  his own personal insurance policy 
against such a possibility or else have an express term in the contract of 
employment covering such an eventuality. It is submitted that as soon 
as the various trade unions in England realize the significance of the
(30> Ibid . at p. 146. 
131) Ibid. at p 141.
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Lister  decision, provisions will commence to appear in future collective 
agreements designed to protect union members from the possible effect 
of w bat is felt to be a serious error on the part of the House of Lords.
In the Province of New Brunswick the Insurance Act provides that 
an owner’s policy shall insure, inter alia, a person who is driving any 
automobile with the owner’s consent against liability imposed by law 
"arising from the ownership, use or operation’' of such automobile.32
The effect of this provision does not appear to be too unlike the endor­
sement in the Lister  case. However, it is to be hoped that the Bench of 
this province will disregard the Lister  ease and not be influenced by it 
if similar circumstances are presented wherein an employee, while act­
ing within the scope of his employment, causes injury to a third party 
through the use or operation of his employer’s vehicle.
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>32) R .S.N.B. 1952, c. 113, s. 202 (1).
